Ethnicity, inequality, and perceived electoral fairness

Abstract: Establishing electoral legitimacy across the population is vital for democratic stability, yet in contrast to other measures of political support, perceived electoral fairness has received scant scholarly attention. Moreover, while research into other measures of political support has shown that they differ by both ethnicity and socio-economic status, no study examines both at once, potentially overlooking important interrelationships between the two variables. This paper combines data from the Ethnic Power Relations project and the World Value Survey to examine respondents' perceptions of electoral fairness according to their ethnic group's access to power, their individual socio-economic status, and the intersection of these two. It finds that one's ethnic group's political status does affect perceived fairness, but that the effect interacts strongly with one's socio-economic status. Poorer members of non-represented ethnic groups have significantly lower perceptions of fairness, while richer members' perceptions do not differ from those of represented groups. The results suggest a levelling effect of socio-economic status on ethnic inequalities.

Keywords: political sociology; ethnicity; social class; electoral fairness

Establishing political legitimacy across the population is one of the main political challenges in ethnically diverse societies. Political support is vital for democratic stability, as its lack may lead to a sense of disconnection or political alienation from the political process (Citrin et al. 1975), which in turn may lead citizens to opt out of or even rebel against that process (Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Norris 2011). Yet various studies show that political support is significantly and considerably lower among members of minority groups than majority groups (Karakoç 2013; Silver and Dowley 2000; Bühlmann and Hänni 2012; Ehin 2007; Hänni 2017b).[1] One of the main reasons for this discrepancy in political support is thought to be minorities' lack of representation in political office, as representation arguably enhances communication between representatives and represented, increases citizens' trust in government and hence political legitimacy, and raises feelings of belonging to the polity (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 2000).

A second set of studies focuses not on ethnicity but on socio-economic status as determinant of political support and consistently shows a negative association (e.g. Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and Singer 2008; Zmerli and Castillo 2015): less well-off individuals perceive that the system they live in does not work as well for them as for others, and are hence less satisfied with or less trusting in this system. That is, just as for the link between ethnicity and political support, the mechanism between socio-economic status and political support is assigned to representation. Despite this commonality, there is very little overlap between the two sets of studies: those examining the ethnicity–support link either do not discuss socio-economic status at all or merely include it as control variable, along with the "usual suspects" age, gender, and education.[2] Yet ethnic groups are by no means homogenous. Not only may

[1] To enhance readability, we use the term "minority" to refer to a socially and politically disadvantaged group, no matter its numbers.

[2] One exception is Hänni (2017b), though note that she uses economic status at the group level and thus does not consider economic differences *within* ethnic groups.

group members differ in, amongst others, their socio-economic status, but they may also assign differing levels of importance to their ethnic group's access to power (e.g. Mansbridge, 1999). Our analysis thus goes beyond the simple association between ethnicity and political support, or socio-economic status and political support, and examines their intersection in order to account for the socio-economic heterogeneity within ethnic groups.[3]

We do so for a dimension of political support not previously examined: perceptions of electoral fairness. By examining evaluations of a political process, rather than of institutions or actors per se, we can more confidently infer whether ethnic or socio-economic status colours individuals' perception of institutions and the output they produce, or political support more widely. Moreover, perceived electoral fairness is of interest in its own right. The legitimacy of the electoral process as a core exercise of the democratic process is crucial for the consolidation of democracy and substantial for political support as such. Citizens who doubt the fairness of elections show lower levels of political support more generally (Norris 2014); are less likely to vote (Birch 2010); and more likely to participate in electoral protests or even violence (Norris, Frank, and Martínez i Coma, Ferran 2015). Yet research on which factors affect citizens' perceptions of electoral fairness emerged only recently, and few studies focus on individual- rather than context-level determinants (Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2015; Flesken and Hartl 2018; Wolak 2014). To our knowledge, none so far has focused explicitly on the link between ethnicity and perceptions of electoral fairness (but see Norris 2004), let alone its intersection with socio-economic status, despite its importance for legitimacy in diverse societies.

[3] The interrelationship between ethnic diversity and economic inequality has previously been pointed out with regard to group-level inequality in the literature on civil conflict; see e.g. Ostby (2008) and Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011). However, this literature is concerned with aggregate patterns of a behavioural outcome (conflict) and thus does not speak directly to individual-level variation and political attitudes.

We conduct this analysis in a cross-sectional comparison of 21 countries, combining the latest wave of the World Values Survey (WVS; 2016) with data on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR; Vogt *et al.*, 2015).[4] We find that while ethnic groups' political status indeed affects perceptions of electoral fairness, it interacts strongly with individual-level socio-economic status: the effect of being a member of a non-represented ethnic group on people's perceptions of electoral fairness depends on each member's socio-economic status. Poorer members have significantly lower perceptions of fairness, while richer members do not differ in their perceptions from members of represented ethnic groups. These findings confirm that different social and political cleavages do not only act individually but that they intersect in their effect on political attitudes.

Going beyond the empirical findings, this analysis also makes a methodological contribution to the cross-country comparison of ethnicity in political attitudes: we translate constructivist theory of ethnicity into practice by taking into account the political relevance of ethnicity and combining survey and country-level datasets in a novel fashion. Importantly, instead of institutions as proxies for representation, we consider ethnic representation itself, which is not only more accurate in comparative analysis but also circumvents the problem of endogeneity.

The following sections elaborate on the hypotheses on how and why different cleavages affect perceptions of electoral fairness and discuss ethnicity in the analysis of political attitudes in cross-country comparisons. We then present the data and methods and examine the effects of ethnic and socio-economic status as well as their interaction, before discussing the findings.

Determinants of electoral fairness

A growing literature on political attitudes in ethnically diverse societies demonstrates a gap in political support between ethnic majorities and minorities. For example, Kurds in Turkey show

[4] Data collection for the sixth wave of the WVS took place between 2010 and 2014. We matched the survey data with the EPR data for the respective (or closest available) year.

lower levels of trust in domestic institutions (Karakoç 2013) and Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia report lower levels of regime support (Ehin 2007) than their respective titular ethnic groups. In comparative analysis, Silver and Dowley (2000) find for a number of political attitudes that differences between ethnic groups within countries are substantially larger than differences between countries. Similar minority–majority gaps are found in political involvement, engagement, and efficacy, confidence in institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and pride in belonging to the nation (Norris 2004; Elkins and Sides 2007; Banducci and Karp 2008; Bühlmann and Hänni 2012; Ruiz-Rufino 2013; Ray 2018).

One explanation for the minority–majority gap focuses on inequality in political representation between groups. Minorities' lack of representation in political office impedes communication between representatives and represented, decreases minority citizens' trust in government and hence political legitimacy, and lowers feelings of belonging to the polity (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 2000). Studies mainly from the USA confirm that minorities who are not represented by members of their own group show lower levels of political approval, efficacy, interest, and trust as well as higher levels of political alienation than those who are (Gay 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004). Following Bobo and Gilliam (1990), these links between representation and political attitudes and behaviour are termed the empowerment hypothesis.

In this paper, we seek to examine whether the empowerment hypothesis extends to evaluations of electoral fairness. Electoral fairness has only recently become the focus of comparative research as integral part of procedural legitimacy, capable of reinforcing or undermining the democratic cycle of procedural legitimacy, accountability, satisfaction with democracy, and participation (Birch 2011; Norris 2014). While the different dimensions of political support and evaluations of electoral fairness are related, they are not commensurable but theoretically distinct (see also Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2015) and should hence also be empirically treated

as such.[5] Electoral fairness focuses on the democratic *process* itself, and its evaluations should hence be less influenced by the regime output – that is, the regime's ability to "deliver the goods" – than other measures of political support. The closest alternative indicator of democratic process evaluations, satisfaction with democracy, is at least as much influenced by respondents' satisfaction with regime output than with the process itself (Linde and Ekman 2003; Norris 2011). In addition, electoral fairness relates to a more direct experience of the object the citizens are asked to evaluate (Wolak 2014; Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2015), which should lead to more accurate, and hence less diverging, evaluations.

However, the complexity of the electoral process – and of potential manipulations – makes truly accurate evaluations difficult (Birch 2011). In such complex circumstances, people tend to use cognitive shortcuts as a guide (see e.g. Fiske and Kinder 1981; Conover and Feldman 1984). Applied to procedural fairness, Doherty and Wolak (2012), for example, show that when processes are clearly fair or unfair, people make unbiased assessments of procedural fairness, yet when the fairness of the process is ambiguous, they are more likely to use prior attitudes to inform their assessments. In this paper, we examine whether, and to what extent, one's ethnic group's political status may work as cognitive shortcut in evaluations of electoral fairness. If political support is a result of psychological mechanisms as described in the empowerment hypothesis, evaluations of the electoral process may be similarly coloured by a perceived lack of representation. Our first expectation is thus that dejected minority citizens perceive the electoral process to be less fair.

But cognitive shortcuts may also take different forms. In the reasoning outlined so far, the implicit assumption was that ethnic group members have an essential identity that all members share and that is different to that of the respective majority group, and with which come shared

[5] This is substantiated by the rather weak correlations between electoral fairness and political trust (Pearson's R^2=0.26) as well as satisfaction with democracy (R^2=0.23) in our data.

interests or worldviews which may affect political attitudes (Mansbridge 1999; Griffin 2014). Accordingly, the assumption is that one's ethnic group's political status does matter, and that it matters for everyone equally. Whether this is indeed the case, however, needs to be established empirically. Moreover, following the logic of cognitive shortcuts, ethnicity may not be the only demographic factor that affects one's political outlook.

Another factor that may act as cognitive shortcut in the evaluation of electoral processes is socio-economic status. While seminal research by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) introduced socio-economic status as a major political cleavage, its intersecting effect with that of ethnicity are often overlooked, partly because scholars, especially in the United States, side with either the ethnicity *or* socio-economic status model of political participation and attitudes (e.g. Nelson 1979; Junn 1999). However, this interaction is of particular interest in ethnically diverse societies as ethnic relations are often reinforced, if not defined, by socio-economic inequalities; yet to date the empirical focus is on group- rather than individual-level inequalities (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Ray 2018), thus implicitly homogenising ethnic groups.

Research on political attitudes at the individual level in general has shown that socio-economic status and in particular income have a positive effect on perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch 2008; Klassen 2014) as well as on related outcomes such as trust in political institutions, general political support, and political participation (Farrell and McAllister 2006; Singh, Karakoç, and Blais 2012; Verba and Nie 1972; Zmerli and Castillo 2015; Anderson and Guillory 1997). Leighley and Nagler's (1992, 2014) explanations for the impact of income on voter turnout can be translated to its impact on perceptions of electoral fairness: party manifestos and government programmes tend to refer to groups of citizens in terms of income, rather than, for example, education or occupational status, and the main mode of interaction of the average citizen with the state is via taxation and distribution. That is, income is a highly salient demographic factor in both political participation and evaluations. Moreover, higher

income leads to higher stakes and hence increased engagement (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Leighley and Nagler 2014). And as policy makers are more responsive to voters than non-voters (Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995), those with higher income may perceive better representation, which in turn affects their evaluation of the process as a whole. These considerations lead to two expectations. First, we expect that income is positively correlated with perceptions of electoral fairness. Second, the especially high salience of income in the context of elections may counteract that of ethnic group status, such that the negative effect of a lack of ethnic representation on perceptions of electoral fairness decreases with higher income. Before we describe the data used to test these hypotheses, we elaborate the role of ethnicity in the analysis of political attitudes.

Ethnicity in the analysis of political attitudes

The empowerment hypothesis – that representation increases political support among ethnic minority groups – motivated comparative research to determine whether more inclusive institutions can reduce the majority–minority gap in political support. Results are mixed: while Banducci and Karp (2008) as well as Ruiz-Rufino (2013) report the gap in a number of political attitudes to be smaller where minorities have greater access to power, Norris (2004) finds that more proportional, and hence more inclusive, electoral systems do nothing to reduce the gap in satisfaction with democracy. For feelings of national pride, Bühlmann and Hänni (2012) as well as Ray (2018) find the gap larger the greater political inequality, but Elkins and Sides (2007) find only mixed effects for inclusive institutions such as federalism and proportional representation.

The inconsistent findings are at least in part due to diverging definitions of and inclusion criteria for ethnic minority and majority groups. For example, for Uruguay, Elkins and Sides (2007) do not identify a relevant ethnic distinction and hence exclude the country from

analysis; Banducci and Karp (2008) do include it and count mestizo, indigenous, and black Uruguayans as minorities; while Staerklé et al. (2010) count the same as majorities and only Brazilians and Argentinians living in Uruguay as minorities. For the Ukraine, Elkins and Sides (2007) as well as Ruiz-Rufino (2013) identify Russians as a minority, while Norris (2004) counts them as majority. The groups in South Africa are varyingly Whites, Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians (Silver and Dowley 2000); Europeans, Xhosa, Zulu, Coloureds, and Asians (Elkins and Sides 2007); or South Africans and Indians (Staerklé et al. 2010). But perhaps the strongest discrepancy is visible for Poland: Elkins and Sides (2007) again do not identify any relevant ethnic distinction; Ruiz-Rufino (2013) lists Byelorussians as minority; Staerklé et al. (2010) Muslims; and Norris (2004) the rural population.

The diverging categorisations result because ethnicity is only rarely considered in the light of the underlying hypothesis – in this case empowerment through representation. Yet a vast literature on the socially constructed nature of ethnicity has taught us that ethnicity is not inherent in physical or cultural differences themselves but dependent on the context (e.g. Hale 2004; Chandra 2012). Accordingly, if the aim is to examine the link between "ethnicity" and political attitudes, we need to define ethnicity in terms of those identity categories that are seen to matter *in* political life and could hence conceivably affect attitudes *about* political life.[6] Cultural or linguistic differences, for example, do not necessarily translate into politically relevant differences (see e.g. Chandra and Wilkinson 2008) – which differences are politically relevant depend on longer-term processes of social and political construction (see Chandra 2012; Weber, Hiers, and Flesken 2016). This also implies that the relevant cleavage may vary from country to country. While in some countries it runs along skin colour, in others it runs along language or religion. In yet other countries, it is a combination of these attributes. These heterogenous outcomes of social-construction processes present problems for comparative

[6] For a related argument with regard to macro-level diversity indices, see also Posner (2004).

survey research, as not every survey has a ready-made "ethnicity" item in its demography section, and even where that is the case, the categories offered may not be along that dimension identified to be relevant for the hypothesis at hand. In the following, we describe how combining country- and individual-level data can address this problem.

Operationalising ethnic group status

To operationalise ethnicity, we take advantage of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, a country-level dataset which codes ethnic groups with regard to both their political relevance and status (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Vogt et al. 2015). A group is coded as relevant "if at least one political organisation has claimed to represent its interests at the national level or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination" (Vogt et al. 2015, 3). In contrast to, for example, the Minorities at Risk (2009) dataset, the EPR hence also includes majority groups.

Moreover, in contrast to the new All-Minorities at Risk dataset (Birnir et al. 2015), EPR also codes all groups according to their access to state power in a given year and thus along lines of representation. The coding distinguishes between seven status categories: monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner, powerless, discriminated, or self-excluded (Vogt et al. 2015). Groups in the first two categories rule alone, but in contrast to monopoly, dominance indicates some limited representation of other groups by "token" members. The senior and junior partner categories indicate that included groups share power in formal or informal power-sharing arrangements. Designation as senior or junior refers to a groups' influence in the executive, irrespective of group size. Groups in the final three categories have no access to state power. Powerless groups lack representation or influence in central government, while discriminated groups are subject to active, deliberate, and directed discrimination in the political realm. Self-exclusion refers to groups who opted out of central government, instead

controlling a particular territory claimed to be independent from the state. We focus here on powerless groups and removed the self-exclusion and discriminated group categories from our analysis since members of such groups, by definition, participate either not at all or only in very limited ways in the electoral process.[7]

To translate ethnic group status to the individual level for each country, we first used the EPR's accompanying *Atlas*, which provides qualitative documentation on every country (see Vogt et al. 2015), as well as further case study literature to define the membership attributes (e.g. language, religion) for all relevant categories. In a second step, we used all pertinent demographic information provided in the WVS dataset – including the in-house coding of ethnicity, language spoken at home, religious denomination, and region where the interview was conducted – to categorise individual respondents as members of the respective groups.[8] Note that the response categories provided for the variable "ethnicity" in the WVS dataset are defined by each country team on a case-by-case basis and are hence by themselves not readily usable for cross-country comparative analyses. Note further that, in contrast to previous efforts (Hänni 2017b; Wimmer 2017), our categorisation is based on the *combination of multiple attributes*, rather than on only a single attribute per country (see Table 1).

Finally, we assigned each respondent the status of their respective group in the respective year according to the EPR dataset. For example, in Georgia, respondents were coded by both a combination of language and religion: respondents speaking Armenian, Asirien, Azerbaijani, or Russian were coded as powerless since these are equivalent to the powerless language

[7] Respondents in these categories are few and hence unlikely to change the results even when included: Baluchis (n=44), Hindus (3), and Christians (1) in Pakistan and Malays (1) in Thailand.
We also omit countries with *only* senior and junior partners, and with no powerless groups, since no comparison between politically included and politically excluded groups is possible.

[8] The variable names correspond to items X051, G016, X048, and F024 in the WVS dataset, respectively. Region was only relevant for coding in countries not covered in this paper, such as Ethiopia, Italy, Ghana, and Switzerland, and is hence not further detailed.

groups described in EPR at the time of the survey. Similarly, Muslim respondents were coded as powerless. Non-Muslim Georgian-speakers were coded as dominant group members. In Mexico, in contrast, skin colour is more important than religion or language in distinguishing between ethnic group statuses, resulting in the coding of mestizos as dominant, and Afro-Mexicans and indigenous as powerless. Members of "other minorities" were omitted from the dataset since their non-identification makes it likely that they are not member of a politically relevant group, and that their group is very small.[9] Respondents whose identity category could not be identified due to item non-response were also omitted.[10]

We dichotomised the different relevant groups into "politically included" (i.e. monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner) and "politically excluded" (powerless) to more clearly reflect whether members of this group are represented in power or not. While we acknowledge differences between power-sharing systems – those with senior and junior partners – and political systems with ethnic monopolies, the binary variable of inclusion and exclusion mirrors the empowerment hypothesis more adequately and is in line with the guiding principle of the EPR dataset (see also Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer 2017). Table 1 lists upon which basis we assigned WVS survey respondents to the ethnic groups identified by the EPR project as politically relevant per country. Overall, we coded 22,085 respondents in 21 countries in this way.

By translating the EPR categorisations of politically relevant ethnic groups from the aggregate to the individual level, we consider the result of the social construction of ethnic identity

[9] The removal of irrelevant ethnic groups led to the omission of a total of 458 individuals. More than half of these were respondents from Australia with "other European" (n=129) or various "Asian" backgrounds such as Chinese or Indian (101). Other groups include Ukrainians in Kazakhstan (23) or Turks in Kyrgyzstan (15) and various "other" in the single digits.

[10] Only 65, and hence comparatively few, individuals were omitted due to item non-response (in Uruguay 22, Australia 20, Thailand 8, Kyrgyzstan 6, Taiwan 3, Colombia and Poland 2, Kazakhstan and Romania 1), making bias due to non-response highly unlikely.

categories at the time of the survey, for the relevant contexts. While individual-level attributes of respondents used are "essentialist", they here only act as markers of membership in politically relevant ethnic groups. This approach allows considering the multidimensionality of ethnicity while ensuring comparability across countries; there is no need to take other country-level factors into consideration that may affect the political relevance of ethnic identity categories, such as the inclusiveness of political institutions: ethnic identity categories are endogenous to institutions (see also Chandra 2001). To reiterate, the main purpose of this paper is to examine whether (and if so, when) someone's membership in an ethnic identity category widely considered to be of political relevance at the *societal* level indeed affects political attitudes at the *individual* level.

[Table 1 about here]

Data and methods

Our dependent variable is perceived electoral fairness. The latest WVS data includes several questions to evaluate the fairness of the electoral process. Respondents were asked how often in the country's elections votes are counted fairly; journalists provide fair coverage of elections; and election officials are fair. We hence conceive of electoral fairness as reflecting the overall process, not Election Day alone (Norris 2014; Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2015).[11] Responses to each item were coded from "very often" to "not at all often". The three items show varying degrees of non-response. To minimise data loss and avoid introducing bias through listwise deletion (King et al. 2001), we use propensity-score matching to impute missing values (Austin 2011). A principal component analysis confirms that the items load on one dimension (Table A1, online appendix), which is stable in all countries. For our dependent variable, we combine

[11] The electoral integrity battery in the WVS includes eight items. Norris (2013) and Flesken and Hartl (2017) both identify four items to load on the same factor: the described fairness items as well as "voters have genuine choice in the elections". We do not include this item here since it may systematically vary with ethnic group status.

the three items into an index. We first reverse the coding such that higher numbers denote higher levels of perceived electoral fairness. We then weight each item by the share of squared component loadings derived from the component analysis and build a summative index (see OECD 2008). Like all following continuous measures, the index is rescaled to range from 0 (here denoting low fairness) to 1 (high fairness).

We described the operationalisation for one of our main independent variables – the representation of politically relevant ethnic groups – above. For our second independent variable we use perceived economic status as indicator for socio-economic status. The respective question in the WVS refers to perceived income group:

> "On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in."

Respondents hence indicate their perceptions of their income group relative to others in their country. While these perceptions do not necessarily reflect one's economic situation accurately – respondents tend to gravitate more to the lower end and middle of the scale – a growing body of literature (e.g. Piketty 1995; Benabou and Ok 2001; Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013) argues that *perceptions of income* are just as likely to affect political attitudes as *income itself*. Perceived economic status hence bears more political significance and entails more aspects than the objective material situation alone.

Control variables

Besides ethnic group and socio-economic status, one of the strongest indicators of political support is vote choice: survey respondents who voted for government parties score

significantly higher on a range of political attitudes (e.g. Anderson et al. 2005). The same holds for perceptions of electoral fairness (Wolak 2014; Flesken and Hartl 2018). We hence include a dummy for electoral win into our models: we code respondents as winners or losers according to whether they support government or opposition parties, respectively, at the time of the survey.[12] We use party position in power rather than the number of votes or seats gained as this indicator is more comparable across different electoral and government systems. Moreover, supporters of a party which obtained the majority of votes but which remains in the opposition are, if anything, more likely to feel as losers of an election.

We also include several other control variables that could affect the relationship between ethnicity and perceptions of electoral fairness. First, media consumption on politics matters for evaluations of electoral fairness (see also Coffé 2016): mediavores may be better informed about actual standards of electoral fairness and their evaluations hence less likely affected by ethnic group membership. The WVS asked respondents how often they use daily newspapers, TV news, radio news, or the internet to obtain information about what is going on in the country. We aggregate these items into an index of media attention, weighted by factor loadings from a factor analysis, and rescale it to range from 0 (no information source ever used) to 1 (all sources used daily).[13] We complement this measure with one of political interest, a binary variable which indicates whether respondents are very or somewhat interested in politics, as opposed to not at all or not very interested.[14]

[12] For lack of a question on retrospective party support asking who the respondent voted for in the last election, we use the WVS prospective question E264, reading "If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?" Asking retrospectively rather than prospectively may yield substantively different results only if party support is very fluid, yet the literature attests to its relative stability (Schickler and Green 1997). Moreover, any change in vote choice is less likely to be affected by perceived electoral fairness than, say, more substantive disagreements with policy positions; citizens distinguish between assessment of specific governments and support for political institutions (Norris, 2011) and specifically confidence in the electoral process (Atkeson et al., 2015).

[13] For the factor analysis, see Table A2.

[14] Using the original four-category coding does not alter the results.

Second, perceptions of electoral fairness may also be affected by direct experiences of malpractice during the elections (Kerr 2013). We therefore include the following two items as controls: how often voters are bribed or threatened with violence at the polls. Since in these questions voters themselves are the objects of electoral unfairness, it is likely that their answers reflect their own experience or observations of their local environment rather than merely media reports. We include both items as dichotomous variables, with "not (at all) often" as reference category.

Finally, we account for socio-demographic background beyond income. Ethnic group size may affect perceptions of electoral fairness, as members of larger but unrepresented groups may feel more strongly about their lack of representation than members of very small groups. In addition, Klassen (2014) finds that in general, older and male respondents are more likely to perceive elections to be fair than younger and female respondents. The effect of education is more mixed: in developing democracies, better educated respondents tend to perceive elections to be less fair than others, while in liberal democracies they tend to evaluate them to be fairer than others do. We include all three socio-demographic variables in the analysis: age is included as log; gender as a binary variable with male as the base category; and education as a nine-category variable ranging from no formal education to university degree, here treated as continuous variable. Descriptive statistics for all individual-level variables are listed in Tables A3 and A4, online appendix.

Beyond individual-level variables we also consider how the country context may affect perceived electoral fairness, especially since the WVS includes a wide variety of countries. The following country-level factors have been argued to affect individual perceptions of electoral fairness: the level of socio-economic development, the actual level of electoral fairness, the level of democracy, regime stability, and the proportionality of the electoral system (e.g.

Anderson et al. 2005; Birch 2008; Coffé 2016).[15] We operationalise socio-economic development with GDP per capita (World Bank 2016). We further operationalise electoral fairness with expert evaluations of electoral integrity (PEI; Norris et al. 2016) and level of democracy and regime stability with the respective measures from the Polity4 dataset (Polity Project 2015). Finally, we operationalise electoral system proportionality with the Gallagher Index of Proportionality (Gallagher 1991; Gallagher 2015).[16]

To take into account the clustered nature of the data we use multilevel linear regression models (Steenbergen and Jones 2002) with two levels (individuals clustered in countries) and random intercepts. The precise models are specified in the respective note fields of the results tables.[17] This approach has the added advantage that we can also include countries with only small numbers of excluded ethnic group members.[18]

Analysis

Table 2 reports the results of five models for perceived electoral fairness. Model 1 includes the control variables only, while Models 2 and 3 also provide the coefficients for members of excluded ethnic groups and income, respectively. Model 4 includes both ethnic group exclusion as well as income additively, while Model 5 presents the interaction of these two variables.

[15] Further factors noted to affect political support are the extent of corruption, freedom of the press, as well as regime type, that is, whether the country is a parliamentary or presidential democracy. We do not include the last in our model presented here as we are concerned with legislative elections and representation. However, including it in the model does not change the results substantively. We neither include corruption or freedom of the press here since both are highly correlated with other country-level variables like gross domestic product or perceived electoral integrity. Running alternative models with these variables provide very similar results to the ones presented here.

[16] For descriptive statistics and further information on the country-level variables, see Table A5.

[17] All, data analysis is conducted using *R* (R Core Team 2015). For the multilevel analyses, we use the package *lme4* (Bates et al. 2015).

[18] Regardless of the relatively large average number of observations per country, the number of excluded ethnic group members are at times very small, not allowing for a simple comparative approach without considerable data loss.

Overall, supporting the opposition, the perception of bribes and threats, belonging to a larger ethnic group, and in some models higher education levels have a significant negative effect on perceived electoral fairness. In contrast, older respondents, those more informed and interested, and those living in richer societies perceive elections to be fairer. Gender as well as ethnic fractionalisation, perceived electoral integrity, the level of democracy, regime stability, and the proportionality of the electoral system do not affect perceptions of electoral fairness when controlling for GDP per capita.

Being a member of an excluded ethnic group affects one's perception of electoral fairness negatively (M2). However, the higher one's income, the higher one's perception of electoral fairness (M3). That is, our first two expectations on the individual effects of ethnic representation and income on perceptions of electoral fairness are supported.

[Table 2 about here]

Model 4 includes both ethnic group status and income. The results confirm those of the prior two models, showing that being a member of a politically excluded ethnic group does indeed have a significantly negative effect on perceived electoral fairness, above and beyond one's socio-economic status or political affiliation.

Model 5 includes the interaction effect between ethnic group status and income to test our expectation on the effect of competing cognitive shortcuts on evaluations of electoral fairness. Although the results are substantively the same as those of Model 4, we observe a substantive effect of the interaction in the saturated model. As the effect of the main variables of interest – ethnic group status, income, and their interaction – cannot be deduced from the table alone (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006), we illustrate the results in Figures 1 and 2.[19]

[19] Figures produced with *R* package *interplot* (Solt and Hu 2016).

Figure 1 shows that among the politically included population, income has a small but significant positive effect on perceptions of fairness (the confidence intervals do not cross 0). Among members of politically excluded ethnic groups, however, the effect of income on the perception of fairness is substantially and significantly higher from that of included ethnic groups. That is, ethnic representation and income indeed interact in their effect on perceptions of electoral fairness: higher income significantly heightens perception of fairness to a larger extent if one belongs to an excluded than to an included ethnic group.

Subsequently, Figure 2 shows that the effect of being a member of an excluded ethnic group decreases with increasing income (the line approaches 0), until excluded respondents with average or higher than average incomes do not differ anymore from included respondents (the confidence interval encompasses 0). This in turn shows again the interaction effect of the two variables: economic disadvantage has a stronger detrimental effect on perceptions of electoral fairness for members of excluded groups than of included groups. And as the bar chart attests, most excluded respondents are in the lower income brackets.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

These results are robust to changes in model specification: we find substantively similar results both when excluding senior and junior partners from the analysis (Table A6) and when using economic or life satisfaction rather than income as alternative measures of perceived advantage or disadvantage (Tables A7–8). We also considered the possibility that excluded groups with high income tend to be situated in countries with high electoral integrity and are hence more likely to evaluate elections as fair, while excluded groups with low income tend to be in countries with low electoral integrity, and that this may only be imperfectly captured by the multilevel model we use. We tested this possibility by running several independent-sample t-tests for income levels according to ethnic group status within individual countries (Table A9).

Only Algeria, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Thailand show highly significant differences in income between ethnic group status, and Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, and Peru marginally significant differences. There is no clear pattern according to levels of electoral integrity and the direction of differences in income: for example, although all four countries have low PEI scores, in Nigeria and Algeria minority income is higher, while in Brazil and Thailand, majorities reported higher income. We conducted sensitivity analyses, running the original model without each of these eight countries in turn, with results very similar to those in Table 2 (Table A10). We therefore discount the possibility of skewed distributions producing the overall result.

Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, we tested the empowerment hypothesis in comparative analysis to establish whether (and if so, when) someone's membership in an ethnic identity category widely considered to be of political relevance at the *societal* level indeed affects political attitudes at the *individual* level. In doing so, we added three contributions to the literature examining political attitudes between ethnic minorities and majorities. First, we went beyond usual indicators of political support by extending the analysis to evaluations of the electoral process, a crucial factor of political support in democracies, and showed that perceptions of electoral fairness indeed vary by ethnic group's access to power. However, second, we found that individual-level socio-economic status affects perceptions of electoral fairness, and it does so not only in addition to but in interaction with group-level representation, thus highlighting the heterogeneity within ethnic groups. Third, underlying our analysis is a constructivist conceptualisation and operationalisation of ethnic groups and their members (political relevance of ethnic groups and their access to power) that was directly informed by the hypothesis at hand (empowerment through representation).

Some limitations of the presented research lie, as with all secondary data analysis, in the constrains of the data available. While WVS country coverage is one of the most comprehensive and diverse compared to other comparative survey data, our analysis is limited to those countries in which the electoral fairness battery was asked, and hence not based on a random selection of countries: the included countries are predominantly from the global south or relatively young democracies, which may raise questions about generalisability to, for example, countries from the global north. A more comprehensive analysis will be possible once WVS wave 7 data is available. In the meantime, a sensitivity analysis with different country subsamples (Table A10) raised no concerns regarding selection bias.

Further constraints relate to the variables used. For example, socio-economic status, measured with perceived income stratification as done here, covers only one aspect of social status. Moreover, the literature on social status suggests that political attitudes are even more affected by status changes, that is, social mobility, than by status at a given time (Benabou and Ok, 2001). Future research should put more emphasis on biographical trajectories of respondents to examine the effect of social status gains, losses, or stability at different levels for shaping political attitudes. The interaction of such trajectories with ethnic group membership would yield interesting findings regarding the effect of status gains and losses on political attitudes. Based on the cross-sectional analysis presented here, we would expect an aggravating effect of status loss for minority groups' political support.

Moreover, while we advocate a constructivist understanding of ethnicity, we acknowledge that this is not always straightforward in practice as the coding relies on the data available and is thus limited to the characteristics of the variables provided (ethnicity, language, region, and religion in WVS6). The data is also confined to the requirements of a representative sample, resulting in (partly) very small numbers of ethnic minorities. More in-depth quantitative

analyses of ethnic groups would require oversampling of some groups to ensure the necessary statistical leeway.

More broadly, this paper only considered whether or not relevant ethnic groups are represented in power. While this coding aligns with the empowerment hypothesis, it may well be the case that minority citizens do not only take into consideration *whether* but also *how well* they are being represented when evaluating the political system (see also Hänni 2017a). The EPR dataset aims to take the extent of ethnic representation into account, yet the data is not designed to cover differences in the *form* of representation (Pitkin 1972) across countries. At the heart of the empowerment hypothesis as well as the EPR data set lies descriptive representation, which we extended here by measuring aspects of substantive representation at the individual level through socio-economic status. However, we could not capture, for example, symbolic or cultural representation at the group-level as championed by multiculturalists. These other forms of representation might be particularly significant, as the interaction effects indicate a kind of trade-off between the different forms of representation, with the importance of descriptive representation at the group level decreasing as substantive representation at the individual level increases. However, the effect of cultural representation on the perception of electoral processes is beyond the scope of this paper.

The paper and its findings speak to several different literatures. First, it speaks to the – to date limited – literature on the salience of ethnicity in the electoral process. While electoral competition may well increase the salience of ethnicity (e.g. Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010), this paper shows that it is necessary to also take other social groupings into consideration. Michelitch (2015) arrives at a similar conclusion after examining the salience of both ethnicity and partisanship during electoral competition in Ghana. Second, our interaction effect also links to the discussion sparked by economists like Piketty (1995) and others (Benabou and Ok 2001; Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013) on social status: it suggests that social status,

expressed as perceived position on an income distribution, can become a "self-fulfilling belief" (Piketty 1998) and effectively change political attitudes.

This leads us, third, to the political psychology literature and in particular to schema theory. Following the underlying assumptions of the empowerment hypothesis, it is one's experience of the political process that shapes one's outlook on politics – it is both the environment and the perceiver that determine to what extent social groups affect political thinking (Conover 1988). With the data at hand we cannot determine whether this is due to, for example, a cognitive effect – that is, that the salience of ethnicity and hence its impact on political evaluations decreases the more the salience of economic advantage increases – or due to an emotional effect: social identity and schema theories stress that group *membership* is not equivalent to group *identification*, and that it is likely identification that has the strongest effects (Tajfel 1981; Conover 1988). Accordingly, one may argue that better-off non-represented respondents do not identify as strongly with their group, leading to evaluations indistinguishable from that of the represented population. This may be especially the case if ethnic groups are associated with social status; in Latin America, for example, it is observed that wealth has a "whitening" effect (e.g. Wade 2004). While the levelling effect of socio-economic status on the observed ethnic group disparities found here suggest a similar mechanism, we leave the answers as to the psychological mechanisms to future research. In any case, our findings point to the importance of disentangling the term ethnicity and to considering reinforcing and cross-cutting effects of diverse social groupings at the individual level.

Consequently, the empowerment hypothesis deserves more scrutiny: when accounting for the differences and diversity within the minority population, empowerment through representation does not hold across the board. This is not to say that such representation is not important, but that the heterogeneity of minority groups needs more recognition. Thus, we can understand the

interaction effect also as a problem of intersectionality. As Crenshaw (1991, 1242) points out: "The problem with identity politics is […] that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences." In this vein, it is also important to look at the left-hand side of the interaction effect in Figure 2: low income and economic disadvantage reinforce the negative assessment of political processes among ethnic minorities. We thus argue that any notion of identity politics is fruitfully accompanied by policies focusing on economic disadvantage and social inequality if the aim is to increase the legitimacy of the democratic political process.

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***Table 1**: Politically relevant ethnic groups and identifying attributes*

	Ethnic Power Relations		*WVS indicators*		
Country	**politically relevant group**	**group status**	**ethnicity**	**language**	**religion**
Algeria	Arabs	included	X	X	
	Berbers	excluded	X	X	
Australia	Aborigines	excluded	X		
	Whites	included	X		
Azerbaijan	Azeri	included		X	
	Lezgins	excluded		X	
Brazil	Afro-Brazilians	excluded	X		
	Indigenous peoples	excluded	X		
	Whites	included	X		
Colombia	Afro-Columbians	excluded	X		
	Indigenous peoples	excluded	X		
	Whites/mestizos	included	X		
Estonia	Byelorussians	excluded		X	
	Estonians	included		X	
	Russians	excluded		X	
	Ukrainians	excluded		X	
Georgia	Armenians	excluded		X	
	Azeri	excluded		X	
	Georgians	included		X	X
Kazakhstan	Germans	excluded	X		
	Kazakhs	included	X		
	Russian-speakers	excluded	X		
	Tatars	excluded	X		
	Uighur	excluded	X		
	Uzbeks	excluded	X		
Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyz	included	X		
	Russians	excluded	X		
	Uyghur	excluded	X		
	Uzbeks	excluded	X		
Malaysia	Chinese	included	X	X	
	Dayaks	excluded	X	X	
	East Indians	included	X		
	Kadazans	excluded	X	X	
	Malays	included	X	X	
Mexico	Afro-Mexicans	excluded	X		
	Mestizos	included	X		
	Other indigenous	excluded	X		
Nigeria	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt	included		X	X
	Igbo	included		X	
	Ijaw	included		X	
	Ogoni	excluded		X	X
	Tiv	excluded		X	X
	Yoruba	included		X	
Pakistan	Mohajirs	excluded		X	
	Pashtuns	included		X	
	Punjabi	included		X	
	Sindhi	included		X	

cont.

	Ethnic Power Relations		*WVS indicators*		
Country	**politically relevant group**	**group status**	**ethnicity**	**language**	**religion**
Peru	Afro-Peruvians	excluded	X		
	Indigenous peoples (Amazon)	excluded	X	X	
	Indigenous peoples (Andes)	excluded	X	X	
	Whites/mestizos	included	X		
Philippines	Christian lowlanders	included	X		
	Indigenous	excluded	X		
	Moro	excluded			X
Poland	Byelorussians	excluded		X	
	Germans	excluded		X	
	Poles	included		X	
	Roma	excluded		X	
	Ukrainians	excluded		X	
Romania	Germans	excluded	X		
	Hungarians	excluded	X		
	Roma	excluded	X		
	Romanians	included	X		
Taiwan	Indigenous/Aboriginal	excluded		X	
	Mainland Chinese	included		X	
	Taiwanese	included		X	
Thailand	Hill Tribes	excluded	X		
	Shan	excluded	X		
	Thai	included	X		
Ukraine	Hungarians	excluded		X	
	Romanians/Moldovans	excluded		X	
	Russians	included		X	
	Ukrainians	included		X	
Uruguay	Afro-Uruguayans	excluded	X		
	Whites/mestizos	included	X		

Note: Authors' elaboration, using the EPR (Vogt et al. 2015) and WVS (2016) datasets, covering all countries that fielded questions on electoral fairness. Omitted are ethnic groups coded as irrelevant, discriminated, and self-excluded. For further information, see main text.

***Table 2**: Determinants of perceived electoral fairness*

	M0	*M1*	*M3*	*M4*	*M5*
	β (se)	*β (se)*	*β (se)*	*β (se)*	*β (se)*
(Intercept)	0.47*** (0.07)	0.52*** (0.07)	0.46*** (0.07)	0.51*** (0.07)	0.52*** (0.07)
Ethnic fractionalisation	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)
Perceived electoral integrity	0.16 (0.14)	0.19 (0.14)	0.17 (0.14)	0.20 (0.14)	0.20 (0.14)
GDP per capita	0.91** (0.29)	0.90** (0.29)	0.90** (0.29)	0.90** (0.29)	0.90** (0.29)
Gallagher index	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)
Level of democracy	0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)
Regime stability	-0.28 (0.18)	-0.28 (0.17)	-0.28 (0.17)	-0.28 (0.17)	-0.28 (0.17)
Affiliation (loser)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)
Affiliation (undecided)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Gender (female)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Age (log)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Ethnic group size	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Education	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)
Media	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Interest (yes)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Bribes (often)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)
Threats (often)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)
Ethnicity (excluded)		-0.05*** (0.00)		-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.08*** (0.01)
Income			0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Ethnicity * income					0.07***

(0.02)

Note: $N_{Country}$ = 21, $N_{Respondents}$ = 18,112 across all five models. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; se = standard error.

Models 1–4 are the same as Model 5 with fewer variables and without the interaction effect between ethnic group status and income. Model 5:

$$fairness_{ij}=\beta_0 + \beta_1 fractionalisation_j + \beta_2 PEI_j + \beta_3 GDP_j + \beta_4 Gallagher_j + \beta_5 democracy_j + \beta_6 stability_j + \beta_7 affiliation_{ij} + \beta_8 gender_{ij} + \beta_9 \log(age_{ij}) + \beta_{10} groupsize_{ij} + \beta_{11} education_{ij} + \beta_{12} mediaattention_{ij} + \beta_{13} interest_{ij} + \beta_{14} bribes_{ij} + \beta_{15} threats_{ij} + \beta_{16} ethnicity_{ij} + \beta_{17} income_{ij} + \beta_{18} (ethnicity_{ij} * income_{ij}) + u_j + e_{ij}.$$

β_n are the regression coefficients, u_j is the effect of country j, and e_{ij} is the residual variation of individual i in country j.

***Figure 1**: Marginal effect for income on perceived fairness, according to ethnic group status*



Note: Dots represent the estimated coefficients of income on perceived fairness among included (0) and excluded (1) ethnic groups in Model 5 (Table 2), while whiskers indicate 95%-confidence intervals.

***Figure 2**: Marginal effects of excluded ethnic group status on fairness for different levels of income*



Note: The line represents the estimated coefficient of being in an excluded ethnic group on perceived electoral fairness for different levels of income in Model 5 (Table 2), while the grey ribbons indicate 95%-confidence intervals. Bar height is proportional to the number of observations along the income spectrum.

Online Appendix

***Table A1**: Principal component analysis, electoral fairness*

How often in country's elections: Election officials are fair	0.816
How often in country's elections: Journalists provide fair coverage of elections	0.619
How often in country's elections: Votes are counted fairly	0.758

Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.583.

***Table A2**: Factor analysis, media consumption*

Information source: Daily newspaper	0.662
Information source: TV news	0.313
Information source: Radio news	0.403
Information source: Internet	0.310

Principal Axis Analysis with Varimax Rotation. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.603.

***Table A3**: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables, by ethnic group status and overall*

	group status	N	mean	sd	median	min	max
Fairness	included	18,916	0.574	0.239	0.588	0	1
	excluded	3,169	0.534	0.227	0.530	0	1
	total	22,085	0.568	0.238	0.588	0	1
Income	included	18,916	0.414	0.238	0.444	0	1
	excluded	3,169	0.416	0.239	0.444	0	1
	total	22,085	0.414	0.238	0.444	0	1
Age	included	18,916	42.329	16.519	41	18	93
	excluded	3,169	41.092	16.189	39	18	89
	total	22,085	42.151	16.477	40	18	93
Education	included	18,916	0.578	0.313	0.571	0	1
	excluded	3,169	0.539	0.304	0.571	0	1
	total	22,085	0.572	0.312	0.571	0	1
Media	included	18,728	0.592	0.267	0.622	0	1
	excluded	3,127	0.586	0.255	0.613	0	1
	total	21,855	0.591	0.266	0.622	0	1
Ethnic group size	included	18,912	0.703	0.221	0.801	0.072	0.96
	excluded	3,157	0.189	0.116	0.142	0.002	0.507
	total	22,069	0.629	0.275	0.73	0.002	0.96

Note: Data from WVS (2016). Limited to respondents of voting age assigned to included and excluded ethnic groups with valid values for perceived electoral fairness (n=22,085).

Table A4: *Descriptive statistics of categorical variables, by ethnic group status and overall*

		group status	n	%
Group status	Included		18,916	86
	Excluded		3,169	14
Gender	Female	included	9,964	53
		excluded	1,653	52
		total	11,617	53
	Male	included	8,952	47
		excluded	1,516	48
		total	10,468	47
Affiliation	Winner	included	6,620	42
		excluded	1,077	42
		total	7,697	42
	Loser	included	7,063	45
		excluded	1,291	51
		total	8,354	46
	Undecided	included	2,114	13
		excluded	188	7
		total	2,302	13
Interest	Yes	included	8,357	44
		excluded	1,171	37
		total	9,528	43
	No	included	10,508	56
		excluded	1,985	63
		total	12,493	57
Bribes	(Very) often	included	9,998	53
		excluded	1,686	53
		total	11,684	53
	Not (often)	included	8,918	47
		excluded	1,483	47
		total	10,401	47
Threats	(Very) often	included	5,244	28
		excluded	919	29
		total	6,163	28
	Not (often)	included	13,672	72
		excluded	2,250	71
		total	15,922	72

Note: Data from WVS (2016). Limited to respondents of voting age assigned to included and excluded ethnic groups with valid values for perceived electoral fairness (n=22,085).

Table A5: *Descriptive statistics of country-level variables*

polity	Ethnic fraction.[a]	PEI[b]	GDP per capita[c]	Gallagher[d]	Level of democracy[e]	Regime stability[f]
Algeria	0.40	42.92	5491.61	21.34	2	9
Australia	0.29	69.97	67646.10	11.29	10	111
Azerbaijan	0.19	34.90	7189.69	8.25	-7	16
Brazil	0.52	67.47	11728.80	2.14	8	29
Colombia	0.41	59.87	7885.06	6.68	7	55
Estonia	0.47	78.77	17453.75	5.09	9	11
Georgia	0.34	58.87	4429.65	2.98	7	23
Kazakhstan	0.53	44.99	12102.69	3.13	-6	20
Kyrgyzstan	0.54	54.24	1123.88	12.83	7	0
Malaysia	0.60	35.48	10834.66	10.79	6	4
Mexico	0.34	57.26	9720.56	6.87	8	15
Nigeria	0.83	53.17	2514.15	7.87	4	12
Pakistan	0.64	49.79	1266.38	13.35	6	4
Peru	0.60	61.80	6389.63	10.23	9	11
Philippines	0.25	51.65	2604.66	8.98	8	25
Poland	0.08	74.39	13142.05	5.95	10	21
Romania	0.19	50.72	8558.40	6.20	9	16
Taiwan	0.27	73.14	21308	9.07	10	20
Thailand	0.32	50.75	6225.05	4.92	7	2
Ukraine	0.37	51.15	3569.76	3.59	6	20
Uruguay	0.17	75.25	14166.56	1.10	10	26

Note:

[a] Ethnic fractionalisation, calculated as Herfindahl Index of ethnic group sizes provided in EPR (Vogt et al. 2015; see Posner 2004).

[b] Perception of Electoral Integrity Index, based on expert evaluations of various dimensions of the electoral process, with 0 indicating low and 100 high electoral integrity (see Norris et al. 2016).

[c] Gross Domestic Product per capita, as reported by the World Bank (2016).

[d] The Gallagher Index captures an electoral system's disproportionality between votes received and seats obtained in the legislature (Gallagher 1991); data from (Gallagher 2015). Missing data calculated by the authors from the respective election results.

[e] Level of democracy as measured by the Polity2 score in Polity Project (2015).

[f] Regime stability as measured by the durability score in Polity Project (2015).

Table A6: *Determinants of perceived electoral fairness, ethnicity without senior and junior partners*

	M6
	β (se)
(Intercept)	0.62*** (0.09)
Ethnic fractionalisation	-0.18* (0.06)
Perceived electoral integrity	0.13 (0.16)
GDP per capita	0.99** (0.33)
Gallagher index	0.01 (0.09)
Level of democracy	0.07 (0.07)
Regime stability	-0.33 (0.19)
Affiliation (loser)	-0.05*** (0.00)
Affiliation (undecided)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Gender (female)	0.00 (0.00)
Age (log)	0.03*** (0.01)
Ethnic group size	-0.01*** (0.03)
Education	-0.02* (0.01)
Media	0.04*** (0.01)
Interest (yes)	0.02*** (0.00)
Bribes (often)	-0.06*** (0.00)
Threats (often)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Ethnicity (excluded)	-0.01*** (0.02)
Income	0.01 (0.01)

Ethnicity * income	0.07*** (0.02)

Note: $N_{Country}$ = 21, $N_{Respondents}$ = 13,490; further see Table 2.

Table A7: *Determinants of perceived electoral fairness, with economic satisfaction*

	M7
	β (se)
(Intercept)	0.51*** (0.07)
Ethnic fractionalisation	-0.12 (0.06)
Perceived electoral integrity	0.2 (0.14)
GDP per capita	0.92** (0.29)
Gallagher index	0.03 (0.08)
Level of democracy	0.05 (0.06)
Regime stability	-0.3 (0.17)
Affiliation (loser)	-0.06*** (0.00)
Affiliation (undecided)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Gender (female)	0.00 (0.00)
Age (log)	0.03*** (0.01)
Ethnic group size	-0.06*** (0.01)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)
Media	0.04*** (0.01)
Interest (yes)	0.02*** (0.00)
Bribes (often)	-0.06*** (0.00)
Threats (often)	-0.01* (0.00)
Ethnicity (excluded)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Economic satisfaction	0.02*** (0.01)

Ethnicity * economic satisfaction	0.05** (0.02)

Note: $N_{Country}$ = 21, $N_{Respondents}$ = 18,082; further see Table 2.

Table A8: *Determinants of perceived electoral fairness, with life satisfaction*

	M8
	β (se)
(Intercept)	0.51*** (0.07)
Ethnic fractionalisation	-0.12 (0.06)
Perceived electoral integrity	0.2 (0.14)
GDP per capita	0.92** (0.29)
Gallagher index	0.03 (0.08)
Level of democracy	0.05 (0.06)
Regime stability	-0.3 (0.17)
Affiliation (loser)	-0.06*** (0.00)
Affiliation (undecided)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Gender (female)	0.00 (0.00)
Age (log)	0.03*** (0.01)
Ethnic group size	-0.06*** (0.01)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)
Media	0.04*** (0.01)
Interest (yes)	0.02*** (0.00)
Bribes (often)	-0.06*** (0.00)
Threats (often)	-0.01* (0.00)
Ethnicity (excluded)	-0.08*** (0.07)
Life satisfaction	0.02** (0.02)

Ethnicity * life satisfaction	0.06** (0.02)

Note: $N_{Country}$ = 21, $N_{Respondents}$ = 18,060; further see Table 2.

Table A9: *Perceived Electoral Integrity and income by group status per country*

country	*PEI*	*Mean income excluded groups*	*Mean income included groups*	*Significance*
Algeria	42.92	0.44	0.39	***
Australia	69.97	0.31	0.43	X
Azerbaijan	34.90	0.54	0.47	X
Brazil	67.47	0.35	0.41	***
Colombia	59.87	0.39	0.48	***
Estonia	78.77	0.36	0.38	X
Georgia	58.87	0.34	0.29	X
Kazakhstan	44.99	0.47	0.49	X
Kyrgyzstan	54.24	0.49	0.52	*
Malaysia	35.48	0.58	0.56	X
Mexico	57.26	0.21	0.27	***
Nigeria	53.17	0.60	0.43	*
Pakistan	49.79	0.51	0.52	X
Peru	61.80	0.37	0.46	*
Philippines	51.65	0.35	0.32	X
Poland	74.39	0.42	0.38	X
Romania	50.72	0.43	0.42	X
Taiwan	73.14	0.38	0.41	X
Thailand	50.75	0.00	0.40	***
Ukraine	51.15	0.37	0.37	X
Uruguay	75.25	0.36	0.39	X

Note: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$, X = not significant, based on within-country independent two-sample t-tests. Income scaled to 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the highest income in country. See further Table A5.

Table A10: *Sensitivity analyses without countries with significant relationships in Table A9*

M5 without:	*Algeria*	*Brazil*	*Colombia*	*Kyrgyzstan*	*Mexico*	*Nigeria*	*Peru*	*Thailand*
	β (se)	*β (se)*	*β (se)*	*B (se)*	*β (se)*	*β (se)*	*β (se)*	*B (se)*
(Intercept)	0.52*** (0.08)	0.53*** (0.07)	0.52*** (0.07)	0.49*** (0.07)	0.5*** (0.07)	0.51*** (0.08)	0.49*** (0.07)	0.45*** (0.07)
Ethnic fractionalisation	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.1 (0.06)	-0.1 (0.06)
Perceived electoral integrity	0.2 (0.15)	0.2 (0.14)	0.2 (0.14)	0.23 (0.14)	0.21 (0.14)	0.19 (0.14)	0.23 (0.14)	0.29 (0.14)
GDP per capita	0.91** (0.31)	0.9** (0.3)	0.9** (0.29)	0.85** (0.28)	0.88** (0.3)	0.87** (0.3)	0.87** (0.28)	0.72* (0.29)
Gallagher index	0.02 (0.12)	0.03 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)
Level of democracy	0.05 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Regime stability	-0.28 (0.18)	-0.29 (0.18)	-0.28 (0.17)	-0.29 (0.17)	-0.27 (0.18)	-0.27 (0.18)	-0.28 (0.17)	-0.17 (0.17)
Affiliation (loser)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.05*** (0)
Affiliation (undecided)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Gender (female)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Age (log)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Ethnic group size	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Media	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Interest (yes)	0.02*** (0)	0.02*** (0)	0.02*** (0)	0.02*** (0)	0.02*** (0)	0.02*** (0)	0.02*** (0)	0.02*** (0)
Bribes (often)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.06*** (0)	-0.07*** (0)
Threats (often)	-0.01 (0)	-0.01* (0)	-0.01* (0)	-0.01** (0)	-0.01* (0)	-0.02*** (0)	-0.01* (0)	-0.01 (0)
Ethnicity (excluded)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Income	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)

Ethnicity * income	0.06** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Observations	17,707	17,716	18,112	16,736	16,721	16,895	18,027	17,056

Note: $N_{Country} = 20$; further see Table 2.